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Interchange fees in card payments are a mechanism to balance costs and revenues
between banks for the joint provision of payment services. However, such fees
represent a relevant input cost used as a reference price for the final fee charged
to the merchants, who may be reluctant to accept cards and induce the cardholder
to withdraw cash. In this paper, we empirically verify for the first time the effect
of the interchange fee on the decision to withdraw cash and compare it with that
of paying with payment cards, considering a balanced panel data set of Italian
issuing banks. Finally, results show that there is a positive correlation between
the cash usage and the level of the interchange fees. Accordingly, regulation of
the multilateral interchange fee level may be an effective tool in reducing cash
payments at the point of sale, although there is no clear evidence that a zero
interchange fee rate (or a close-to-zero rate) would be optimal.
1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to perform a first empirical investigation on the impact
of the interchange fee on the propensity to use automated teller machine (ATM) cash
withdrawals versus card payments at the point of sale (POS). But first we have to take
a step back and describe what interchange fees are and how they work the payment
networks, in which payment services are jointly provided by intermediaries to the ben-
efit of different end users in a widespread network. In the leading credit and debit card
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schemes, the merchant’s bank (the acquirer) pays an interbank exchange fee (inter-
change fee) to the cardholder’s bank (the issuer) for each payment card transaction,
in compensation for services received. These fees may cover very simple interbank
services or extremely complex ones (trademark, clearing, authorization, charge-back)
that benefit different parties (banks, merchants and cardholders). Interchange fees are
usually set multilaterally, that is, uniform fees (so-called multilateral interchange fees
(MIFs)) are established by the governing bodies of the respective networks.
Moreover, heterogeneous types of customer in two-sided markets and network
industries could justify the existence of interchange fee flows. In the case of payment
card schemes, different own-price demand elasticities of cardholder and merchant can
be noted. For instance, whenever the interchange fee is directly transferred (or sur-
charged) to the cardholder, network expansion could be hampered, as the cardholder
would not be willing to bear high expenses on payment card transactions.
The economic literature generally endorses the maintenance of an MIF, but shows
that, privately and socially, optimal interchange fees often diverge (Rochet and Tirole
2002, 2011). In addition, the utility functions of the public authorities dealing with
the interchange fee problem are heterogeneous (Rochet 2007); for instance, competi-
tion authorities may particularly care about end-user surplus, and central banks may
consider the payment system as a whole.
Competition authorities claim that economic theory is not sufficient to justify an
MIF, and the causal link between MIFs and efficiencies needs to be demonstrated
empirically, since the interchange fee is a cost for the acquiring bank and may become
a de facto floor for merchant fees. Hence, setting a framework to determine which
MIFs can be justified on a case-by-case basis is one way of creating more effective
competition in payment card pricing.
After the adoption of the single currency in Europe, the issue of interchange fees
has also characterized the long and difficult process underway to create a single euro
payment area (SEPA). The European Commission recently launched a public dialogue
on the present landscape of the cards network, including the possibility of regulating
interchange fees (European Commission 2012).1 The Commission also conducted
several legal assessments on the two major international card payment schemes (Visa
and Mastercard).
The central banks, and the Eurosystem, in pursuit of its mandate to promote the
smooth operation of payment systems, generally claim that MIFs, if there are any,
1 For instance, as regards SEPA Direct Debit payment instruments (which allow bank customers
to give companies or other organizations authorizations to take money directly from their bank
accounts to pay their bills in Europe) the European Commission has already issued an ad hoc
Regulation (924/2009) aimed to cap the MIF and to prohibit it after a transitional regime.
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should not lead to bad price signals toward payers and payees, distracting them from
using more efficient payment instruments (Börestam and Schmiedel 2011).2
More recently, economists have further analyzed the effect of interchange fees on
technological innovation and on consumers’ choices of payment instruments, espe-
cially considering the substitution between cash and payment card. The debate has
been directed toward the imposition of a “price cap” or “zero” MIF rule (Leinonen
2011).
However, there are still few empirical studies on the issue of interchange fees,
which has been mostly addressed by the literature from a theoretical point of view.
For instance, to the best of our knowledge, available empirical evidence does not
include direct estimates on the effect of the interchange fee on the choice of cash,
which is considered inefficient in several studies on the social cost of retail payment
instruments (Schmiedel et al 2012).
So we can return to the main objective of this study: assessing the impact of the
interchange fee on the propensity to use ATM cash versus card payments at the POS.
Toward this aim, we consider a two-period balanced panel data set of about 300
Italian issuing banks. The test is particularly interesting to perform in Italy, a country
characterized by a high propensity to use cash (Banca d’Italia 2012a).
In Section 2, we review the relevant literature on antitrust issues and the economics
of interchange fees. In Section 3 we give details and descriptive statistics on the
payment card market and the interchange fee both in Italy and the rest of Europe.
Section 4 illustrates the model under analysis and the econometric approach. The
results are discussed in Sections 5 and 6, while the conclusions and some policy
indications are reported in Section 7.
2 ECONOMICS OF INTERCHANGE FEES
Interchange fees may be applied to any noncash retail payment network that involves
more than one intermediary (such as checks, credit transfers, direct debits, etc). How-
ever, they are most typical of the payment card schemes. The credit and debit card
networks are generally four-party schemes (Figure 1 on the next page), involving:
(1) the cardholder, who uses the card to purchase goods and services and generally
pay an annual fee to the issuer;
(2) the issuer, the bank that issues the payment card to the cardholder;
2 In Italy, from 1998 to 2005, the Banca d’Italia (as the competition authority and overseer) estab-
lished rules and requirements on the level of fees in Italy, and its approval was required after every
revision. Since 2006, such rules have been adopted and updated by the general Antitrust Authority.
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FIGURE 1 Four-party scheme.
Issuing bank Acquiring bank
MIF
eg, Mastercard, VISA
Cardholder Merchant
Cardholder fee Merchant fee
(3) the merchant, who accepts the card as payment for goods and services and pays
the merchant fee to the acquirer;
(4) the acquirer, the merchant’s processing agent who recruits merchants to the
scheme, processes their card transactions, obtains funds from the card issuer
and reimburses the merchant.
In the case of payment cards, costs are usually skewed to the issuing side and
acquirers can have more revenues, provided that merchant fees are related to the
turnover and the cardholder fees are fixed per payment card. The interchange fee paid
by the acquirer to the issuer is intended to offset such cost/revenue imbalances, so the
issuer can issue more cards and maximize the system output without surcharging the
cardholder, who would be unwilling to make purchases by card.3
During the last twenty years many theoretical models have been developed, under
different assumptions, to justify the existence of the interchange fee. For a long time
3 The payment card associations still consider their interchange fee as “a financial adjustment to
reduce the imbalance between the costs associated with issuing and acquiring, with a view to
increasing demand for use of the payment services” (Visa International 2001). The governance
authorities of the card payment schemes also argue that if each of the network’s thousands of
participants were to negotiate interchange fees bilaterally with each of the other thousands of network
participants, the costs would be prohibitive. Furthermore, if any of the resulting agreements failed,
some merchants would no longer accept certain issuers’ cards, and the very notion of the network
would be impaired.
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there has been a general consensus (see Börestam and Schmiedel 2011) on the fact that
payment card interchange fees may be useful in order to increase electronic payments.
The two most frequently quoted articles on the economics of interchange fees are
Baxter (1983) and Rochet and Tirole (2002). In his important early work, Baxter
(1983) argues that under the assumption of perfect competition the socially optimal
interchange fee is generally nonzero, that internal forces will drive the interchange fee
to the socially optimal level and that the authorities should not consider interchange
fees in payment card networks negatively. Twenty years later, Tirole and Rochet
(2002) analyzed the cooperative determination of the interchange fee and concluded
that raising the interchange fee will increase the use of credit cards so long as the
fee does not exceed a level at which merchants no longer accept the card. A higher
interchange fee lowers cardholders’ fees, so that consumers who previously were
not cardholders are induced to become cardholders. The optimal interchange fee for
issuers is the highest level at which merchants continue to accept the card, and it is
significantly different from zero.4
More recently, Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2011) have extended their analysis through
applying the theory of the “two-sided market”, in which, under certain conditions (eg,
different demand elasticities), one side of the market will pay relatively less than the
other side, to take into account some positive indirect network externalities in the
market. In the payment card scheme, the side of the market that would pay relatively
less is that of the cardholder, since the issuing bank receives the interchange fee
revenues from the acquiring bank. On the acquiring side, the merchant fee, which
includes both the interchange fee input costs and the acquiring internal costs, will be
charged to the merchant. This solution should allow the merchant to increase their
sales at the POS.5
4 Such an outcome is valid under the no-surcharge rule (issued by the self-regulatory bodies in order
not to crowd out their payment cards), which prohibits affiliated merchants from charging higher
prices to customers who pay with credit cards or from offering discounts to those who use other
payment instruments, such as cash. Some economists claim that if such rules are removed (and
surcharges are allowed), the level of MIFs would not impact card usage (neutrality), as the cost and
benefit are transferred efficiently to the end users (Gans and King 2003; Zenger 2011). Nevertheless,
retailers may be reluctant to surcharge (Jonker 2011; ITM 2000; European Commission 2010;
Börestam and Schmiedel 2011). Moreover, in some countries, including Italy, surcharge to electronic
payments is prohibited by law in order to reduce the risk of promoting cash (see Coppola 2011;
Doria 2010), as also pointed out by some empirical studies (Bolt et al 2008).
5 In their contribution, Rochet and Tirole (2011) give a practical rule in order to internalize usage
externalities in two-sided payment card markets. This is known as the “tourist test”, or “merchant
indifferent test” (MIT, as renamed by the competition authorities) and defines the optimal level
of interchange fees. As a result the “tourist test” understates the threshold interchange fee (and
corresponding merchant service commissions) at which a rational merchant would be indifferent
between accepting cards or cash for a particular transaction.
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With regards to the competition policy issues, antitrust authorities admit that MIFs
are one way to internalize network externalities and thus to optimize card usage.
However, MIFs also restrict competition and might be, therefore, prohibited to the
extent that they do not generate sufficient efficiencies.6 In the more relevant antitrust
decisions (European Commission 2010), the European Commission has imposed
caps or some kind of audited self-regulation to reduce interchange fees over the year,
under the assumption that such fees might undermine competition and inflate final
prices.
In this context, there is a common perception that on the acquiring side the merchant
is charged according to an “interchange fee plus” model; accordingly, the merchant
fee (mf) is calculated as follows:
mf D if C c C qc: (2.1)
In the notation of (2.1), “if” is the unit interchange fee, c represents the direct unit
internal cost for the acquirer and q is the margin in proportion to the direct costs to
cover indirect costs together with the profit. The antitrust authorities fear that such a
pricing mechanism sets a de facto floor limit on the price that merchants must pay
to the acquirer for accepting payment cards. We consider such an assumption in our
empirical model of analysis in Section 4.
The next step in the literature is then to relate the MIF with a bias toward the use
of cash. A recent discussion paper published by the Bank of Finland (Leinonen 2011)
has focused on the problem of the MIF and the “cash cross-subsidies” on the issuing
side. According to Leinonen, “the higher the MIF, the larger the cross-subsidy for
cash”, provided that interchange fees increase payment costs for the merchants, who
become reluctant to accept cards instead of cash, and thus reduce the possibility of
passing on to customers the cost savings resulting from card efficiency.
Unfortunately, there is a scarcity of empirical contributions evaluating the effects
in the real world of the interchange fee mechanism, due to the lack of reliable data
on this matter. From the available studies in Europe, a decreasing trend in different
European countries is associated with an increased usage of cards and competition
between card schemes (Börestam and Schmiedel 2011; Bolt and Schmiedel 2013).
Chakravorti et al (2009) analyze the positive effect on the growth of payment card
transactions after the interchange fee regulation in Spain (ceilings on the MIF levels).
6 The multilateral setting of the interchange fee among participants of a payment scheme, even
where it is a default level with the possibility to negotiate a lower fee on a bilateral basis, may
constitute a restriction of market competition pursuant to antitrust legislation. In allowing such a
multilateral agreement, the antitrust authority must determine whether setting a multilateral fee “may
improve the supply of payment services since banks avoid a large number of bilateral negotiations
and transaction costs are reduced”, with potential benefits for the final customer (Bank of Italy,
Provision 23, October 8, 1998).
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FIGURE 2 Cash card ratio and payment cards transactions.
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Data for card payments per POS in 2011. Sources: European Central Bank, Blue Book statistics.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned authors test the impact of the interchange fee cap
regulation on the merchant acceptance of cards in Spain but the issue of the impact of
the interchange fee on the cardholder’s inclination to shift to cash remains unsettled
(Börestam and Schmiedel 2011).
Therefore, we shall test empirically the cash demand in relation to the interchange
fee in Italy, after a brief description of the payment card landscape.
3 PAYMENT CARD MARKET,THE CARDHOLDERS’ PROPENSITY
TO USE CASH AND THE INTERCHANGE FEE
The payment card is the most prevalent noncash instrument in Europe. Card transac-
tions accounted for 40% of cashless payments in 2010, and volumes are increasing
at around 6–7% per year (European Central Bank statistics 2012). In Italy there were
over 1.5 billion annual payment card operations in 2010, representing 38% of the
total noncash payments that year (compared with 21% in 2000), but the “gap” with
other industrialized countries is still large: only twenty-seven card transactions per
capita annually compared with over seventy in the whole EU in 2010 (Banca d’Italia
2012b).
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FIGURE 3 MIF and cash–card ratio.
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The latest data confirms that cash is still the most widely prevalent payment instru-
ment in Italy, to a greater extent than in other industrialized countries (over 90% of
transactions at the POS, compared to around 80% in the rest of Europe (see Schmiedel
et al 2012)). This is also confirmed by comparing the cash–card ratio per country.
The cash–card ratio gives the value of cash acquired from ATMs divided by the total
value of card turnover (the total value ofATM withdrawals plus the total value of debit
POS expenditure by card (see Jones and Jones 2006)). In Figure 2 on the preceding
page, the cash–card ratio per country is plotted in relation to the number of domestic
card payments divided by the number of POSs: it is obviously a negative correlation,
and Italy is on the side of the chart (the axes are centred on the mean values of the
distribution) with countries that present a low level of POS utilization and a high
propensity to use a card to acquire cash.
Figure 3 shows the average payment card interchange fee (as a percentage) by
country as well as the cash–card ratio. The principal sources of data were the card
payment schemes and the European Central Bank (Börestam and Schmiedel 2011).
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There is a positive correlation between the use of debit cards at ATMs and interchange
fee levels: in those countries where the interchange fee is the lowest, debit cards seem
to be more widely used and accepted at the POS. Moreover, there is a significant
variability between average levels of the MIF (on the horizontal axis): the average
(transaction-weighted) MIF varies from a minimum of about 0.01% to over 1.55% in
different member states (Börestam and Schmiedel 2011).
4 MODEL OF ANALYSIS
The model of analysis is based on the functioning of a payment card on the issuing
side (Leinonen 2011): banks or other payment service providers issue payment cards
in order to allow the cardholders to charge purchases or withdraw cash directly against
funds on a transaction account at a deposit-taking institution (debit cards), prepaid
account (prepaid cards) or according to credit facilities (credit cards). Payment cards
(especially debit cards) may be used for ATM transactions as well as at POS terminals
at retail locations.7 When the payment card is used directly in shops, the issuer receives
interchange fees revenues from the acquirers in the case of “not on us” transaction
(when the issuer and the acquirer are not the same party). If the issuer and the acquirer
are the same party (an “on us” transaction), the interchange fees are not applied but
remain an implicit acquiring cost element in the pricing to the merchant. In every
case, the cardholder does not usually pay variable fees at the POS.
When the card is used in the ATM card networks, the cardholder is charged a fee
only if the transaction is performed at a “foreign ATM” (owned by an institution
different from the issuing bank), because in the case of “foreign transactions” the
issuer will pay an interbank service fee to the ATM owner. Nevertheless, in the case
of cash withdrawals at the issuer’s ATM, transactions are usually free of charge for
cardholders. In fact, over 75% of ATM transactions are carried out at issuer’s ATM
terminals in Italy (Ardizzi and Coppola 2002).
In this work we jointly consider all types of cards (debit, credit, prepaid) for a
variety of reasons. First of all, in this way we can remain aloof of any substitution
effects between cards. Second, many merchants agree on a product bundle which is
offered at a “blended” price that makes it difficult to compare different card types cost
of acceptance (European Central Bank 2006). Finally, available revenue information
on the cardholder is not always easily distinguishable between types of cards. For this
reason, debit card networks usually show lower interchange fees than credit cards
(European Commission 2010), and issuing banks specializing in credit cards receive
higher average levels of interchange fee.
7 However, in this work we consider all the payment card types (debit, credit, prepaid) issued
by banks, so as to control for any substitution effect among cards and because of difficulties in
distinguishing statistical information.
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FIGURE 4 Transmission channel of the interchange fee mechanism.
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On the issuing side we can correlate the POS interchange fee and the behavior of the
cardholder interacting with the merchant. Given the “interchange fee plus” mechanism
(Section 3), if interchange fees are too high, merchants might be reluctant to accept
the card at the POS and induce the cardholder to shift to cash. Figure 4 illustrates the
main transmission channels of the interchange fee mechanism on the issued customer
card according to our model analysis.
This approach has the advantage that it does not require a simultaneous equation
model (as in Chakravorti et al 2009 or Bolt et al 2008), which may impose several
restrictions. We focus on the final information collected by the card-issuing bank,
overcoming the problem of modeling the interaction between the merchant and the
cardholder: the result of this interaction is given by the value of cash withdrawn and
of POS payments carried out through the same cards, on which the issuer gains the
interchange fee from the acquirer.8
8 On the other hand, the acquiring bank does not collect information on the cash withdrawals with
the same cards. Moreover, reliable information on the acquiring side is not available. For these
reasons we do not consider a simultaneous equation model as in Chakravorti et al (2009).
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Moreover, our model is valid even when merchants want (or are allowed) to apply
a surcharge on card payments: if the interchange increases average unit transaction
costs, a merchant will be less inclined to accept card payments or will be more likely
to surcharge card payments (Jonker 2011; Bolt et al 2010) with the same effect: to
induce the cardholder to withdraw cash at the ATM.
We can then assume a linear relationship between the cash–card ratio, the
MIF and other control variables Z, with conditionally independent errors E."it j
Zit ; MIFit / D 0, i banks and t periods, and run a regression model such as the
following:
cash ratioit D ˛0 C a1MIFit C
X
h
˛hZit C uit : (4.1)
The dependent variable (cash ratio) is equal to the ratio of ATM cash withdrawals to
the total amount of card turnover (at POS and ATM), which is consistent with the
“cash–card ratio” described in Section 3.9
The first variable on the right-hand side of (4.1) is equal to the percentage of the
average transaction-weighted (Chakravorti et al 2009) MIF received by the issuer
on its cards. Its coefficient aims to capture the effect of the interchange fee on the
cash–card ratio of the same cards issued by the bank.10 To identify this effect, we
follow a two-stage process. In the first stage we assume, as usual, linearity in the
functional relationship. In this case, it is essential that we have linearity in the MIF
parameter, but not necessarily essential in the predictor. Accordingly, in this section
we shall determine the existence of a trend of the MIF impact with respect to the
cash–card ratio in Italy. In other words, we verify whether an increase in the level of
the MIF gives rise, on average, to more ATM cash withdrawals than card payments
at the POS.
Thus, we put forward our first hypothesis:
(H0) under condition of linearity in the parameter, the higher the interchange fee,
the higher the cash–card ratio on the issuing side, and vice versa.
In Section 6, as a second stage of the analysis, the linearity assumption will be removed
in order to further investigate the issue “what about the optimal MIF?” Economic
9 In this case, we did not include theATM operations in the denominator so as to avoid the dependent
variable being truncated between zero and one.
10 Although the interchange fee levels are usually set by a self-regulatory body, various market
conditions will, of course, affect the MIF variability at the level of the banks. This variability
is remarkable and supposedly exogenous with respect to the payments and withdrawals of cash
through ATMs. In other words, even if the selection of the card at the POS automatically affects the
MIF received by the bank in our model, we are most interested in assessing how the variability of
the interchange fee level affects the cash usage. Accordingly, self-selection problems related to the
choice of the debit and credit cards may be omitted in our model.
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theory (Rochet and Tirole 2002) affirms that interchange fees may increase the card
usage at the POSs (accordingly, the cash ratio tends to decrease11) up to a threshold/
optimal level, after which the acceptance costs surpass the benefit, the shift (return)
to cash becomes relevant and the cash ratio rises. However, adding nonlinearity (or
“second-order” effects) in the econometric model may be complex and requires further
statistical checks; we focus on this issue in the next section.
The summation term among the covariates in (4.1) indicates the set of h envi-
ronmental variables (Z), and that of the relative coefficients, which can influence
the use of cash versus electronic payments at the POS. Control variables identify
income components, which are also highly correlated with financial literacy, leading
to less use of cash, and access point diffusion (ATMs, bank branches, POSs), which
may affect the choice between cash and alternative payment instruments (Stix 2004;
Humphrey et al 1996).
One of the control variables identifies the individual income component, which is
also highly correlated with general education and financial literacy, leading to less
use of cash and greater confidence in alternative payment instruments (Stix 2004;
Humphrey et al 1996). In the model, such an income component is indirectly measured
by the value of total turnover per card for transactions that are completed at POSs
and ATMs.12 Therefore, we consider Z1 D turnover. Even the expected effect of this
variable on the cash–card ratio is positive, and the related hypothesis to be tested is
the following:
(H1) the higher the average turnover per card, the lower the inclination toward the
use of cash withdrawals as an alternative to electronic card payments.
A second control variable (Z2 D ATM) takes into account the relative size of
the ATM card network managed by intermediaries, expressed as the ratio of the
number of own ATMs and the number of own POSs.13 A larger diffusion of the ATM
card network may increase the probability of the bank having its own ATM cash
withdrawals, which are free of charge for the cardholder (positive coefficient). We
then formulate the following hypothesis:
11 Actually, to the best of our knowledge the net impact on the cash–card ratio is not clearly inves-
tigated by the theoretical models.
12 The turnover per card represents a proxy of the spending capacity of the cardholders, as we do
not dispose of detailed information on the effective average income per cardholder.
13 The latter standardization allows us to compare issuing banks characterized by different business
strategies:ATM services versus POS or acquiring services.At this stage, we do not include separately
the number of POSs in the equation, as the correlation between the number of ATMs and POSs is
very high (0:82), increasing the risk of collinearity in the model. However, as a further test of stability
we also include separately ATM (expected sign: positive) and POS (expected sign: negative) (see
Section 5.3).
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(H2) the bigger the ATM network, the higher the motivation toward the use of cash
withdrawals as an alternative to electronic card payments.
Moreover, in order to control the over-the-counter (OTC) cash operations that could
crowd out ATM cash withdrawals, our model includes an indicator of the relative
incidence of the number of physical bank branches (OTC) to the number of automated
cash machines or ATM (Z3 D OTC). This control variable is expected to affect the
cash–card ratio negatively, according to the following hypothesis:14
(H3) the higher the diffusion of the OTC network (number of branches to ATMs),
the lower the motivation toward the use of cards to withdraw cash at ATMs.
As in the works of Chakravorti et al (2009) and Bolt et al (2008), we will not
include the rate of interest in the model analysis: based on standard economic theory,
the interest rate is expected to have a negative effect on the demand for money, via its
role of opportunity cost of holding cash in alternatives to interest-bearing assets.15
However, since we want to further test the stability of our outcomes, in the robust-
ness analysis we also include among the covariates a proxy of the interest rate levels
calculated as the ratio of the total amount of interest expenses to the total amount of
deposit liabilities (data is available for all the banks in the panel).
Finally, in the longitudinal models the term uit in (4.1) can be broken down into
an individual specific effect, a temporal effect and the stochastic disturbance ("it ). In
particular, the individual specific effect incorporates the unobservable elements16 of
“firm-specific” or “group-specific” heterogeneity, reducing the omitted variable bias
14 As a further test of stability of the empirical results, we remove such a hypothesis from the
equation model in Section 5.3 (“robustness”), by assuming that the effect of demand for OTC cash
withdrawals is neutral for the dependent variable and homogenously affects both ATM (negatively)
and POS (negatively) transactions.
15 One reason to omit the interest rate at this first stage is that available banking data on interest rates
is not consistent, as it does not consider only the cardholders’ current accounts and does not fully
match that on our balanced panel database. Moreover, the inclusion of the deposit interest rate may
hamper the endogeneity problems, since it may be simultaneously affected with other variables (ie,
size and institutional ones). Furthermore, several studies investigating the role of innovative payment
systems in cash demand of Italian households (Lippi and Secchi 2009; Alvarez and Lippi 2009)
point out that the progress in transaction technology may substantially reduce (or even eliminate)
the impact of the interest rate on the cash demand of buyers, also considering that the period covered
by our estimations was characterized by very low interest rates, which are likely to have strongly
mitigated the speculative motive. Finally, our model deals with a ratio of cash-to-card payment
flows rather than stocks of liquid assets, which implies the effect of the interest rate is ambiguous,
which could in principle impact proportionally on both denominator and numerator of the ratio,
leading to null overall effect.
16 These elements may, for example, be linked to the internal payment procedures, to the type of
customer and to the differences in the business strategies.
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TABLE 1 Panel data set. [Continues on next page.]
(a) Definition of variables and data sources
Variable Definition Source
MIF Average transaction-weighted interchange
fee received by the issuing bank
BoI banking statistics
and survey on the
cost of payment
instruments
Cash ratio Ratio of the value of total ATM cash
withdrawals accounts to the value of total
POS payments with issued debit and credit
cards
BoI banking statistics
ATM Ratio of the number of owned ATMs to
number of owned POSs by the issuing
bank
BoI banking statistics
OTC Ratio of the number of bank branches to
the number of ATMs
BoI banking statistics
Turnover Total value of card operations to total
number of issued cards
BoI banking statistics
I rate Ratio of the total amount of interest on
deposit to the total value of bank deposits
BoI banking statistics
(b) Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs
MIF overall 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.026 N D 546
between 0.004 0.000 0.023 n D 273
within 0.002 0.004 0.018 T D 2
Cash–card overall 1.879 1.509 0.685 11.468 N D 546
ratio between 1.492 0.860 8.593 n D 273
within 1.104 1.031 3.424 T D 2
ATM overall 0.043 1.724 0.006 0.534 N D 546
between 1.708 0.007 0.247 n D 273
within 1.109 0.020 0.093 T D 2
Turnover overall 1383.879 1.265 493.454 2915.985 N D 546
between 1.245 727.352 2453.721 n D 273
within 1.090 846.756 2261.716 T D 2
OTC overall 0.921 1.357 0.333 3.000 N D 546
between 1.348 0.412 2.500 n D 273
within 1.067 0.582 1.456 T D 2
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TABLE 1 Continued.
(c) Correlation matrix
Variable Cash ratio MIF Turnover ATM OTC
Cash ratio 1.0000
MIF 0.3928 1
Turnover 0.1787 0.0089 1
ATM 0.0778 0.0038 0.0702 1
OTC 0.1789 0.1108 0.1308 0.0691 1
in the estimates. We do not formulate the hypothesis here. The time-specific effect can
be captured by providing a time dummy variable, which may be useful for considering
the effects of business cycle influences or technological changes (Chakravorti et al
2009).
5 ESTIMATION OF THE LINEAR SINGLE EQUATION MODEL
5.1 Data set and estimation methodology
We use bank data drawn from the reports of the intermediaries on payment services
collected by Banca d’Italia and from the survey on the costs of retail payments in
Italy conducted in 2010 in close cooperation with the European System of Central
Banks (Schmiedel et al 2012; Banca d’Italia 2012a). Combining the different sources
of information, on the basis of the available data (accumulated at the bank level) it
has been possible to construct a biannual (2009–2010) balanced panel of 273 issuing
banks representing about 60% of the debit and credit card market in Italy. The database
contains data (counted from the side of the issuing bank for 2009) concerning the
interchange fee levels, cash and POS transactions, cards and accepting terminals,
branches and other firm-specific variables. Table 1 on the facing page reports the
definition, descriptive statistics and information about the different data sources for
the whole sample.
As has been noted in the theoretical literature (Zenger 2011), payment networks
typically differentiate their interchange fees by setting a variety of sector-specific
MIFs for the same payment card. Figure 5 on the next page shows the density function
of the average (transaction-weighted) percentage interchange fee for issuing banks
of our sample. A significant variability of the average rates is evident at a bank level,
not so different to that shown on Figure 3 on page 80 at a country level. This is due
to different card payment networks (national debit card and international debit and
credit cards), different pricing schemes (two-part tariffs, ad valorem fees, flat fees)
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FIGURE 5 Interchange fee (ad valorem).
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Average interchange fee
Kernel D Epanechnikov, bandwidth D 0.0011. Sources: balanced panel data, banking statistics (2009, 2010).
and different technologies of transaction (eg, base, chip and pin, enhanced electronic).
Average MIF variability also affects the average merchant debit and credit discount
fee variability.17
The parameters of (4.1) were estimated using the balanced panel data observed
in 2009 and 2010. The dependent variable and the covariates described in the pre-
vious chapter are expressed in terms of logarithms in order to reduce the dispersion
and the asymmetries. Robustness checks adopting further estimation techniques are
conducted in Section 5.3.
Several methods have been proposed for the estimation of panel data models with
a large number of cross-sectional units observed over a rather short period of time
(in our case, N D 273 and T D 2). The estimated values of the static coefficients in
17 Detailed information on the current nominal interchange fee rates in Italy are available through the
websites of the card payments associations. See, for example, www.visaeurope.com/en/about_us/
our_business/fees_and_interchange.aspx, www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/whatwedo/interch
ange/Intra-EEA.html and www.bancomat.it/it/infoutenti/esercenti.html.
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(4.1) can be obtained by classic panel model estimators18 with fixed, random, between
effects and by the standard (pooled) least squares (OLS) estimator.
The Hausman test (fixed versus random effects) and the J -test for overidentify-
ing restrictions robust to heteroscedasticity, strongly support (2 > 22; p-value <
0:0002) the FE model and reject the assumption that the unobserved bank-specific
effect is independent from the explanatory variables. Moreover, the Breusch and Pagan
(1980) test refutes the hypothesis of “poolability” (cross-sectional model instead of
panel model: 2 > 195; p-value < 0:0001). However, Cameron and Trivedi (2005)
argue the chi-square test and the “fixed effect” estimator may be subject to statistical
problems when the “within” variability is dominated by the “between” variability of
the panel (see Table 1 on page 86). Accordingly, in Section 5.2, we show the out-
come for each estimation procedure (FE, RE, BE, OLS) to better evaluate the general
performance of the model analysis.
First of all we estimate the base model, which considers only the percentage inter-
change fee (MIF), the card spending (Turnover), and the time dummy variable between
the covariates,19 Then we include the other control variables (full model) and test the
stability of the results with respect to the disturbances affecting the initial model; a set
of institutional ((1) commercial banks, (2) post office, (3) cooperative and rural banks)
and size ((1) small bank, (2) medium bank, (3) large bank) dummy variables are also
included in the OLS, BE and RE estimators. A further test of stability including the
(proxy of) interest rate is reported in the robustness analysis.
5.2 Results
The results of the estimates are shown in Table 2 on the next page.
The estimated models (base and full) show coefficients that are all statistically
significant and with signs consistent with our theoretical hypotheses (H0)–(H3), after
controlling for the institutional and size dummies, whose coefficients are not reported
18 The between effects (BE) estimator exploits exclusively the “between” dimension of the date
by regressing the individual averages of the dependent variable on the individual averages of the
covariates; the fixed effects (FE) estimate exploits solely the “within” dimension of the data by a
regression in deviations from individual averages; the standard least squares estimator is applied
to the pooled data, which can be shown to be an (inefficient) average of the between and within
estimators; the random effects (RE) estimator, which is an efficient average of the between and within
estimators, while the weighting is based on the ratio of the variances of the individual specific effect
and the stochastic disturbance.
19 A time dummy variable may be useful to take into account the effect of the business cycle
influences or technological changes even in a biannual model.
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for the sake of brevity.20 The negative sign of the time dummy variable seems to be
consistent with a linear trend of growth of card payments in Italy.
As expected, the coefficient of the interchange fee variable is consistently positive.
The magnitude of the effect, moreover, is quite significant: a decrease of 10% in the
MIF rate is associated with a reduction in the cash ratio of approximately 1%. Such an
outcome also represents an indirect test that the “interchange fee plus” mechanism is
present and that interchange fees are not neutral.21 Such results seem to be consistent
with those obtained by Chakravorti et al (2009).
The value of turnover per card (“Turnover”) shows a significant negative impact
upon the cash–card rate, as well as the higher relative diffusion of physical branches
(OTC and ATM). The relevance of the ATM/card network dimension turns out to be
significant and positive, given that such a variable may be a proxy of the probability
that the intermediary intercepts the cards used at its own ATMs by providing free
cash withdrawals.22 In the “fixed effect” model the ATM and OTC coefficients lose
significance. This can be partly explained by the fact that such (infrastructural) vari-
ables do not vary significantly in the biennium, and the inclusion of the firm-specific
dummy variables capture unobserved bank heterogeneity that is constant over time.
5.3 Robustness checks
We conducted several robustness checks of the outcomes illustrated in the previous
subsection, using alternative estimation methods that control for the presence of
(1) contemporary heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of the residual terms,
(2) nonnormal distribution of the variables,
(3) endogeneity problems due to simultaneous causality or omitted variables.
Each of the above points highlights a violation of the assumptions underlying the
linear regression models and can make the results inconsistent.
20 The full model performs quite well also in term of fit: the F -statistics is significant at 1%;
the overall adj-R2 tends to 0:89 in the fixed effect specification (least squares dummy variable
regression); we will deal again with this issue in the robustness checks. Moreover, main results are
robust aggregating the information of the intermediaries that belong to the same banking group, in
order to control for possible “group” specific effects. For the sake of brevity, we do not present the
results of these tests, but they are available on request from the author.
21 Based on empirical assessment of the Reserve Bank of Australia payment system reform, Hayes
(2007) finds no significant impact of interchange fee level on the card usage. Nevertheless, this
partly contradicts Chang et al (2005) and Chakravorti et al (2009).
22 This result is confirmed if we include ATM (expected sign: positive) and POS (expected sign:
negative) separately in the model (see Table 5 on page 97).
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The method used to control the first distortion factor, indeed, relies on proper
statistical tests,23 we cannot reject the hypothesis of contemporary heteroscedasticity
and cross-sectional and autocorrelation that can lead to biased statistical inference in
the panel (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Therefore, in order to adjust the standard error
appropriately, we decide to apply the linear estimator with a panel-corrected standard
errors (PCSE) estimator suggested by Beck and Katz (1995). In particular, we specify
that, within groups, there is first-order autocorrelation and that the coefficient of the
AR(1) process is specific to each group.24 In addition, we consider a standard OLS
regression robust to bank-specific clustered standard errors.25
Regarding the second distortion,26 we consider a “quantile” regression estimator
(“Quantile” estimator), where the relationship between y and x is not expressed by
the variation of the conditional mean of y given x (classical linear model), but by the
variation of one of its quantiles (eg, median). This approach is useful in the presence
of nonnormal distributions of the dependent variable, or of high statistical dispersion,
which may make the mean value less significant. Furthermore, it may be interesting
to calculate the impact of the MIF rate at different levels of the cash–card ratio (ie,
25th or 75th percentile).27 For this method we have also resorted to the nonparametric
bootstrap to calculate the standard errors and test the significance of the estimated
23 Specifically, we used the Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in panel data, the Greene
(2000) test for groupwise heteroscedasticity and the Pesaran (2004) test for cross-sectional depend-
ence in panel data.
24 In particular, we consider the Prais–Winsten generalized least squares (GLS) estimator, derived
for the AR(1) model for the error term, which represents a further innovation of the original OLS
PCSE method proposed by Beck and Katz (Stata Technical Bulletin 1995).
25 The usual OLS assumption is that standard errors are independently and identically distributed,
but this assumption is clearly violated in many cases.A natural generalization is to assume “clustered
errors”, ie, that observations within groups (i banks) are correlated in some unknown way, inducing
correlation in eit within i , but that groups i and j do not have correlated errors. In the GLS-PCSE
model we also remove the latter assumption.
26 A standard Shapiro–Wilk test for normality rejects such an assumption (Racine 2008). The method
most appreciated when addressing the problem arising from nonnormal distribution of the variables
is nonparametric statistical techniques, which are robust to functional misspecification and do not
require a researcher to specify functional forms for the objects being estimated. However, we leave
this extension to future research.
27 The estimation for quantiles is conducted on the “pooled” panel, in order to gain degrees of free-
dom. The quantile regression applied to panel models in fact requires a large sample size in order to
unbundle the unobservable individual specific effects and produce consistent estimates (see Koenker
2004). Also, differencing (or de-meaning) the data, as we would do under an OLS framework, is
not appropriate for quantile regressions: the quantiles of the sum of two random variables are not
equal to the sum of the quantiles of each random variable. Moreover the interpretation given to
individual fixed effects is less appealing in quantile regression models, as the quantile regression
already accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and heterogeneous effects.
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TABLE 4 Further robustness check against the assumption of exogeneity of the MIF:
GMM estimator.
A B
Variableı GMM RE GMM FE
MIF 0.1545 0.3280
N 273 546
p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01. ıFull model; all other explanatory (Zi ) variables are omitted. All variables
enter the regressions in logarithms. Robust standard errors are omitted. Generalized method of moments (GMM):
A, size and institutional specific dummies included; B, individual fixed effect included.
coefficients without necessarily making assumptions about the probabilistic model
and the reference distribution of the sample.28
The third factor of distortion (simultaneous causality) is the possibility that the
relationship between the cash–card rate and the interchange fee (or other covariates)
is bidirectional or that there is nonzero contemporaneous correlation between the
regressor(s) and the error term. For instance, if another unobserved variable jointly
determines both a high cash–card ratio and high levels of interchange fees, the econo-
metric models will not give consistent estimates. As noted above, the interchange
fee variables are set by the self-regulatory body. Nevertheless, if some immeasurable
aspects of the environment in which banks operate are associated with the acceptance,
issuance or usage of cards, the risk of endogeneity bias in payment instruments analy-
sis may increase (Chakravorti et al 2009). Thus, the standard Durbin–Wu–Hausman
(DWH) test does not allow us to confirm the strict exogeneity of the MIF variable if
the “fixed effect” estimator is applied, but only in the absence of firm-specific inter-
cepts this assumption is not refuted.29 Accordingly, we also consider a two-stage least
squares estimator (2SLS), using lagged values of the MIF and other selected variables
as instruments (see Chakravorti et al 2009).30
28 The results reported consider the regression on the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles of
the dependent variable.
29 If the “firm-specific” intercepts are not included, the assumption of exogeneity is not refuted.
However, we consider also the instrumental variable regression without individual “fixed effect”
(see Table 3 on page 94).
30 Other instrumental variables are the current value of the average transaction at POSs (see Table 3
on page 94), which may affect the average interchange fee levels (relevance condition) and should
not necessarily be correlated with the error term in (4.1) (validity condition), as confirmed by
“first stage” 2SLS test (Hausman) and the Sargan–Hansen of overidentifying restriction test (see
Wooldridge 2002). Moreover, we also consider the (lagged) instrumental variable “network” (equal
to the product of the number of ATMs and the number of cards managed by the issuing bank) and
the lagged value of the “Turnover”.
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TABLE 5 Further robustness check of stability to perturbations in the parameters (alter-
native specification of the model and GMM estimator).
Model‚ …„ ƒ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable RE FE GMM IVRE GMM IVFE
MIF 0.0811 0.0719 0.1248 0.1683
Turnover 0.2900 0.1724 0.5998 0.1196
ATM 0.1162 0.0923 0.2044 0.0935
Pos 0.0935 0.1522 0.0449
N 546 546 273 546
p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01. All variables enter the regressions in logarithms. Robust standard errors are
omitted.Additional variables:ATM D (log) number of ATMs;Pos D (log) number of POSs.Models (1) and (3) have size
and institutional specific dummies included. Models (2) and (4) have individual fixed effects included. Instrumental
variables for GMM models: A, (3), random effect. Instrumented: MIF. Instruments: MIFt1, Turnovert1, Networkt1.
As a further robustness check, similar results are obtained if we consider the following alternative instruments:
MIFt1, dIM PPOS, dIMP ATM; for the sake of brevity, we do not present such results in the table. B, (4), fixed effect.
Instrumented: MIF. Instruments: AVG_POS, Network. Legend instrumental variables: network D number of ATMs
owned  number of cards issued. AVG_POS D mean value of the card transaction at the POSs.
The outcomes relative to the different robust estimators31 are reported in Table 3
on page 94.
As a result, the robustness checks seem to be more than satisfactory. Across all of
the methods adopted, the significance and the intensity (positive) of the MIF effect on
the cash–card rate (cash ratio) are confirmed.32 Moreover, the inclusion of the (proxy)
of the interest rate does not affect the main results.33
31 Least absolute deviation methods (quantile regression) may be affected by endogeneity problem
as well. However, this issue is not well developed in literature yet and beyond the scope of this first
empirical investigation.As a further test of robustness, we limit to apply the (two-stage) instrumental
variable quantile regression model proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008), who recently
introduced an ad hoc command in the Stata Software, considering the same instrumental variables
included in the instrumental variable least squares regression. Such an extension confirms the main
conclusions of this paper and results are available upon request.
32 The selection of the “full” model as the best one is supported by the Akaike information criterion
(AIC). However, the AIC measure gives less support to the model including interest rates together
with the time dummy. The time dummy intercept is indeed significantly correlated (Pearson’s
correlation coefficient: C0:46) with the interest rate variation across the two years.
33 Recall that a proxy of the interest rate has been included just as a test of stability of the estimates
shown in Section 5.2. However, all the estimates shown in Table 3 on page 94 have been replicated
without the “interest rate” variable and no significant changes in the relevant coefficients have been
found. For the sake of brevity, we do not present such results.
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The magnitude of the marginal effect of the interchange fee rate is stronger and
more significant for banks in the upper tail of the distribution (quantile regression)34
and after controlling for endogeneity in the instrumental variable (IV) least squares
estimation35 (Table 3 on page 94). Finally, we replicated the regressions through the
generalized method of moments (GMM) method developed by Hansen, which is less
affected by the distributional assumptions (such as normality) than the 2SLS and
may be more efficient in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form and
weak instruments (Wooldridge 2002). In addition, we further tested the sensitivity
of the model to perturbations of the parameters by removing hypothesis (H3) and
adopting an alternative specification to control for the network effects: we added the
number of POSs together with the number of ATMs (without normalization) among
the covariates. The main results are confirmed and summarized in Table 4 on page 96
and Table 5 on the preceding page36
6 WHAT ABOUT THE OPTIMAL MULTILATERAL INTERCHANGE
FEE? FIRST EVIDENCE FROM A NONLINEAR APPROACH
As discussed in our review of the literature, one relevant policy issue is concerned with
the determination (or regulation) of the optimal level of interchange fee. For instance,
according to Rochet and Tirole (2008), an MIF reduction may be translated as an
increase in the cardholder fees with a negative net impact on the “social welfare func-
tion”, which is a single-peaked function including different components (consumer
surplus, retailers’ profit and banks’ profit). This means (Rochet and Tirole 2008) that
the optimal interchange fee (MIF) that maximizes the social welfare function may
be nonzero (Figure 6 on the facing page).
Since there was a risk that card payment schemes set excessively high interchange
fees to increase banks’ profits, the competition authorities started to limit exces-
34 It is interesting also to note that the (negative) estimated coefficient for “Turnover” increases
monotonically and considerably for the upper quantiles’ regressions, suggesting that the income
effect on the demand for cash is stronger for banks in the upper tail of the distribution.
35 As in the standard FE estimations, the estimated coefficients of the control variables lose con-
sistency in the IVFE specification, but we cannot exclude that this is due to their collinearity with
the individual specific intercepts and the limited “within variability” in the biannual panel. We also
excluded the interest rate in the IV regression models, to reduce endogeneity problems.
36 The diagnostic tests for endogeneity and overidentifying restrictions in the GMM estimates
(Table 4 and Table 5) are consistent with the ones obtain in the 2SLS estimates (Table 3). We
also remove the “I rate” variable, which is not robust to the test for the orthogonality/exogeneity
condition in the GMM model (Sargan). All these results are available upon request from the author.
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FIGURE 6 Interchange fee and social welfare.
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Source: Rochet and Tirole (2011).
sive interchange fees through the cost-based regulation or the implementation of the
“tourist test”, but always admitting positive levels of interchange fee in the system.37
Nevertheless, in recent years the debate has focused on the issue of whether the MIF
on the modern card networks should be dismissed or maintained. Some economists
claim that the interchange fee should be reduced to zero so as to remove direct and
indirect regulatory costs to the market participants (Gans 2007) and to promote both
competition and efficiency in retail payments, as compared to a situation with positive
interchange fee (Leinonen 2009).
The theoretical problem of the optimal interchange fee determination is beyond
the scope of the present paper. We can just find some clues through a more in-depth
investigation of the relationship between the cash demand and the MIF according to
our model analysis. Indeed, the cash–card ratio may be taken as a practical indicator
for a social planner who is interested in shifting from cash to electronic payments.
In order to delve deeper into the effective impact of the interchange fee on the
choice of payment instruments, as a first descriptive investigation we consider the
multivariable scatter plot smoother (nonparametric approach),38 which is a valuable
37 Rochet (2007) states that “competition authorities often care only about user surplus and not about
social welfare. This is justified if the profit of firms (banks) is completely dissipated. This is not
justified if profit is reinvested to provide quality of service or attracts entry (lower prices, increased
product variety)”.
38 The methods most appreciated when addressing the problem arising from nonlinear relationships
are the nonparametric statistical techniques, which are robust to functional misspecification (ie,
linear or polynomial). However, we leave this extension to a future research. In this case we adopted
a nonparametric method called “k-nearest neighbours” or “k-nn”, which is available through the
software Stata 10 (Royston and Cox 2005). In this case, a simple estimator (corresponding to a
uniform kernel) is to take the k observations nearest to x, and fit a linear regression of yi on Xi
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FIGURE 7 Multivariable scatter plot smoother.
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Multivariate nearest-neighbour smoother; other explanatory variables contained in (4.1), including bank-specific and
time dummy variables, are omitted in the figure.The upper and lower lines represent a pointwise confidence interval
(95ı) for the smoothed values of “cash ratio”.
tool in exploratory data analysis (when the aim is to arrive at a parametric final model)
and does not require us to specify functional forms for objects being estimated and
strongly increases the goodness of the fit (Royston and Cox 2005). This graphical
tool allows us to obtain a picture of the relationship between the “cash ratio” and MIF
of (4.1) and each of the other explanatory variables simultaneously. The fitted (log)
values of the cash–card ratio conditioned to the (log) average transaction-weighted
MIF rate are shown in Figure 7.
Consistent with the findings reported in the previous sections, the MIF and the
preference for cash withdrawal tend to be positively correlated. Nevertheless, this
relationship is neither linear nor strictly monotonic: it is only beyond a certain level
that the MIF impact is binding and the relationship with the cash–card ratio becomes
strictly positive.
That being said, starting from Figure 7 we can try to estimate parametrically the
nonlinear (second-order) effect of the MIF by adding a quadratic term in the original
using these observations. A smooth local linear k-nn estimator fits a weighted linear regression (see
Hansen 2012).
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TABLE 6 Estimation of the quadratic equation model (6.1).
Modelı‚ …„ ƒ
A B C D E F
Regressor1 PCSE2 FE3 RE4 IVRE5 OLS6 q507
MIF 0.1564 0.0727 0.1057 0.4579 0.1961 0.1641
(0.0421) (0.0253) (0.0228) (0.1304) (0.0264) (0.0248)
MIF2 0.0639 0.0229 0.0375 0.1716 0.0750 0.0565
(0.0208) (0.0121) (0.011) (0.0511) (0.0126) (0.0124)
Adj-R2 0.8526 0.8953 0.2761 0.1708
Estimated turning points
(ln) MIF 6.55 6.91 6.73 6.66 6.63 6.78
MIF 0.0014 0.0010 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011
ı
“Full” model, MIF variable is log transformed and normalized on the sample mean; all other explanatory (Zi )
variables are omitted. All variables enter the regressions in logarithms. Significance: p < 0.01, p < 0.05,
p < 0.1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 1MIF variable is log transformed and normalized on the sample
mean. Other explanatory variables (Zi ) contained in (6.1), including bank-specific and time dummy variables, are
omitted in the table. 2Panel corrected standard error estimator. 3Fixed effect estimator. 4Random effect estimator
5Instrumented random effect estimator. Instrumented: MIF. Instruments: MIFt1, turnovert1, networkt1. 6OLS
estimator. 7Quantile regression (50ı percentile).
equation model of (4.1), as follows:39
cash ratioit D ˛0 C a1MIFit C a2MIF2 C
X
h
˛hZit C uit : (6.1)
Whereas MIF and its squared term are strongly correlated (r D j0:94j), we have
normalized the variable on its sample mean before taking its logarithm in order to
reduce collinearity problems. Hence, we estimate (6.1) through the methods proposed
in the previous sections.40 For brevity, we just report estimated coefficients for the
linear and quadratic MIF term (see (6.1)).
The outcomes in Table 6 show that the estimated regression coefficients for the
first-order and second-order effects of the MIF are both positive and significant. This
means that the cash ratio–MIF linear slope gets more positive as the MIF increases,
the quadratic in MIF has a hump shape and the turning point (Wooldridge 2002) in
39 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
40 We selected the following methods: ordinary least squares (OLS), quantile regression (q50),
panel data random effect (RE) and fixed effect (FE), also controlling for autocorrelation and cross-
sectional dependence (PCSE) and instrumental variable GMM random effect estimator to take into
consideration endogeneity problems. As we show in Section 5.3 (see footnote 35 on page 98), also
in this case we exclude the IVFE specification, because of a collinearity problem with the quadratic
term and the individual specific intercepts and the limited “within variability” in the biannual panel.
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the single peak response probability is equal to Œa1=.2a2/ > 0.41 Accordingly, the
turning point, at which we have the minimum (fitted) value of cash ratio, is positive
and different from zero MIF. This outcome seems to be consistent with the theoretical
framework provided by Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003).Although they do not consider
the “cash–card ratio” explicitly in their model, our cash–card ratio may decrease until
reaching the turning point. However, further empirical investigations are needed on
this issue, such as in the case of the longer confidence interval for the smoothed values
of “cash ratio” in Figure 7 on page 100, due to higher dispersion of the data at the
lower tail of the MIF levels.42
Finally, the estimated turning point in the quadratic function (or “threshold level”)
is always much lower than the actual mean level of the MIF as reported in Table 6
on the preceding page and Table 1 on page 86, respectively. This means that the
quadratic in MIF is positively skewed for a long stretch and that the positive linear
trend, discussed in the previous section, is predominant.
7 CONCLUSION
The multilateral setting of interchange fees is usually justified because it reduces
network transaction costs and increases payment card usage. Some economists and
antitrust decisions also show how the interchange fee is an intermediary cost used as
a reference price for the final fee charged to merchants (the so-called interchange fee
plus mechanism). Nevertheless, few empirical works have measured the net impact
of the interchange fee on the end user’s decision to pay by card or withdraw cash.
Starting from our model of analysis, we consider the “cash–card ratio” as a prac-
tical reference indicator for a social planner who is interested in shifting from cash
to electronic transactions. This would be consistent with the position expressed by
several central banks, affirming that a strong shift to payment card transactions in
lieu of cash would reduce the overall social cost of the payment industry and increase
savings for payment service providers, firms and consumers. In Italy the cash–card
ratio is higher than the average level in Europe. Thus, the main objective of this paper
is to conduct a first empirical investigation on the impact of the interchange fee on
the choice of cash withdrawals over card purchases for POS payments. This allows
us to confirm that a regulation of the MIF level may be an effective tool in reducing
the cash payments at the POSs.
Our results and robustness checks show that there is a positive relationship between
cash usage and interchange fee mechanism, and that current mean MIF levels are still
41 As the MIF variable is logarithmically transformed and normalized on the sample mean, the
turning point is calculated as follows: expŒ.a1=2a1/ C mean.MIF/.
42 This can be also confirmed by the parametric regressions.
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too high to foster card acceptance in lieu of cash. Such a result is consistent with those
obtained by Chakravorti et al (2009). Furthermore, from a first empirical investigation,
such a relationship is not strictly monotonic, especially at the lower tails of the MIF
level distribution.
Hence, we cannot also affirm that a zero MIF level would be optimal to increase
electronic transactions, and we leave this topic for future research. We note that
a relevant part of the economic literature perceives that a zero MIF rate may be
counterproductive for the payment card diffusion and this may compromise the market
incentive for innovation (Rochet 2007).
Finally, although the problem of the optimal interchange fee determination is
beyond the scope of the present paper, our empirical model may inspire further
research on the issue of interchange fee regulation. Indeed, our approach encour-
ages investigation of the impact of different MIF rates on the substitutability between
different means of payments, through relevant information collected on the issuing
side. This payment data is usually more reliable and easy to obtain from the regulation
authorities and our simple method of analysis may give some clues for how to enhance
the efficiency of the payment system. For instance, policymakers may define some
scenario analysis with the results of changes in the cash ratio as a result of changes
in the average MIF.
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